Why Do Financial Intermediaries Buy Put Options from Companies? by Gyoshev, Stanley et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Why Do Financial Intermediaries Buy
Put Options from Companies?
Stanley Gyoshev and Todd R. Kaplan and Samuel Szewczyk
and George Tsetsekos
University of Exeter, University of Exeter and University of Haifa,
Drexel University, Drexel University
9 March 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69922/
MPRA Paper No. 69922, posted 12 March 2016 14:51 UTC
Abstract
Companies have collected billions in premiums from privately sold put options
written on their own stock, yet almost all of these puts expired worthless and their
owners lost money as a result. Although these losses seem puzzling, we model how
by offering to buy put options from better informed parties, investment banks receive
private information about the issuing company. Empirically, we find a 12% increase
in the stock prices and a 40% increase in the trading volumes around the put sales.
An examination of 13D filings reveals that upper management insiders increased their
long position on the stock around the put sale - consistent with them having private
information. However, the magnitude of the volumes and the lack of change in the
shares outstanding indicate that other informed-of-the-put-sale parties might also
have acted. By examining 13F filings, we find no evidence that these parties were
institutional investors.
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1 Introduction
In February 1991, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a ruling that
allowed publicly traded companies to sell put options written on their own stock. This
practice began modestly with IBM, which realized profits in 1992 in excess of $2 million
from its put option sales.1 The practice quickly spread to companies such as Microsoft,
which over a seven-year period beginning in 1993, received over $2 billion in total premiums
from sales of puts including $766 million in 1999 alone.2 While bringing in such significant
revenues, company-written put options expired out of the money in almost all cases. The
practice of companies writing put options on their own stock abated in the wake of the
2000-2002 bear market; however, usage of these deals has reemerged. For instance, in 2011,
Qualcomm Inc. received $75 million in put option proceeds (and its put option program is
ongoing as of January 2015).
Although the original spirit of the SEC ruling was to allow companies to issue put op-
tions publicly on an organized exchange like the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE),
most companies placed their options privately with investment banks or other qualified in-
stitutional buyers.3 Like with any put option, the issuer takes a long position on the stock
while the purchaser takes a short position. Gibson et al. (2006) compare the accounting
performances of companies with put option sales to a matched sample and find that com-
panies with these sales have significantly higher return on assets (ROA), operational return
on assets (OpROA), and net income return on assets (NIROA) for the first three years after
1University of Virginia, Darden Case Study UVA- F-1009 (1992).
2For a detailed Microsoft case study refer to Gyoshev (2001).
3The initial ruling to allow the sale of put options was in fact made in favor of a request submitted by
the CBOE.
the put sales (with the lone exception the first year of NIROA). Jenter et al. (2011) finds
an abnormal mean stock return of 4.68% over 100 days after a put option sale along with a
3.36% abnormal mean return around the first earnings announcement after the sale (from
5 days before to 40 days after). Gibson et al. (2006) and Jenter et al. (2011) find that not
only are the companies that issue puts gain from the sales, but also their managers are
making use of privately held information to help the companies time the market.
The writing of a put option is a zero-sum game in which the two parties bet on the
direction and magnitude of future changes in stock prices. Gibson et al. (2006) and Jenter
et al. (2011) show that one side (the managers) are consistently winning this game, which
is not surprising because they are better informed. Intriguingly, of the few options that
did not expire worthless, a large percentage were settled before the expiration date where
again the company had an informational advantage. So why, does the counterparty agree
to these bets?
Furthermore, investment banks commonly approach issuing companies about purchas-
ing put options.4 So either the investment banks choose to make losing purchases for them-
selves or choose to arrange such purchases for their clients. The clients are fully informed
that the counterparty is the company itself due to the fact that this is a non-standard
option with a default risk by the company.
Gibson and Singh (2000) and Gibson et al. (2006) provide a possible explanation to
this puzzle with a signalling model of put option sales. In their models, companies with
strong outlooks choose to signal their long-term expected value in order to increase the
4For example, Tom Pratt (1994) cites Paul Mazzilli at Morgan Stanley & Co. as stating that “a large
portion of the companies that do [repurchase] programs with me have been introduced to [selling put
derivatives], and use the strategy.”
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price of their stock in the short term (companies maximize a weighted sum of short-term
and long-term share prices). The counterparty is willing to buy the options since they are
sold at a fair price (and neither side profits directly from the transaction).
We build a model that captures the information content of put issues in the Gibson
and Singh (2000) and Gibson et al. (2006) models. To this model, we add a stage to where
the option can be bought back by the company. This second stage provides a means for
the put owner to obtain new information acquired by the company after the first stage.
While the purchasers may lose money from the transactions (and the companies gain), the
purchasers gain information. While outside the model, the purchasers can overall profit if
this privately obtained information is used in trading on the company’s stock.
Our model yields insight as to why investment banks purchase put options from com-
panies and we empirically explore the data for consistency with the model. To start, we
substantiate Jenter et al.’s (2011) result of abnormal stock performance around the put
transaction; however, in contrast, we only look at the first put transaction used by a com-
pany since the information content can vary in strength over repeated put option sales (as
Gyoshev, 2001, suggests). Here, we find a 12% abnormal return in the stock prices over 60
days compared to the 4.68% found by Jenter et al. (2011) over 100 days.
This abnormal return supports the hypothesis that the companies had private infor-
mation about their future stock performance and used this information to time the sale
of put options to when the stock was undervalued. However, we then test for abnormal
volume around put option sales and find an increase of 40%. This increase indicates that
a party gained and used information beyond a private put sale and is consistent with our
model. Furthermore, we find no significant change in the number of outstanding shares
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and treasury shares, indicating that the company itself was not actively involved in the
increase in volume.
We also test for structural breaks in the time series of the abnormal return of the stock
prices around the put transactions and reject the null hypothesis that no structural break
exists at day 0 and endogenously find a structural break at day 7. We also test for structural
breaks in the volume time series and endogenously find structural breaks at day -19 and
day 12. The observation that the trading volume increased before the transaction date is
consistent with the knowledge that a put transaction is likely to have an effect.
Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) find that there is a stock price increase following a stock
repurchase, but unlike what we find with put option sales, these increases only occur once
companies disclose their purchases in their earnings announcements. Since stock repur-
chases can be accomplished without the seller knowing that the buyer is the company itself
nor the size of the repurchases, no party outside the company itself, its upper management,
and perhaps its broker would know about the size of the recent repurchases. The difference
again suggests that the early price and volume movements could be due to outside parties
who possess information.
To further explore which parties are making the trades, we examine 13D and 13F
filings. An examination of 13D filings reveals that upper management insiders (but not
shareholder insiders, i.e., those with more than a 10% stake in voting shares) increased
their long position on the stock around the put sale - consistent with them having private
information. However, the magnitude of the volumes and the lack of change in the shares
outstanding indicate that other informed parties might also have acted. By examining 13F
filings, we find no evidence that these were institutional investors. This is still consistent
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with our model. If the investment banks are intermediaries and not the final holders of
the put options, then their clients that purchased the put options could also be purchasing
shares because the transaction remains private for an average of six months.
2 Theoretical Model
One reason that investment banks are willing to buy put options from better informed
parties is that while they may lose in that transaction, they gain private information from
those companies that issue the put options. In a similar manner, the investment banks
act merely as an intermediaries for clients where each client may lose in the transaction
but gain information. If true, this reasoning requires that companies make decisions that
depend upon their information about future company value. In other words, the companies
must be in a separating equilibrium in regards to put contracts. This equilibrium allows
investment banks or their clients to screen for companies with positive outlooks.
In this section, we demonstrate how this separating equilibrium exists in a screening
model where the contracts are offered by a buyer to a company. To ease exposition, we do
not explicitly model how buyers profit from information gained nor how they decide upon
what terms to offer the company, only how they may gain information from particular
contracts.
As we mentioned, our model demonstrates how the company can privately reveal infor-
mation to the buyer of the put option via screening. There are other related papers about
how information can be revealed through financial transactions. Oded (2005) demonstrates
how information can be publicly revealed in a signalling model of repurchase program an-
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nouncements. Similarly, Kim and Kallberg (1998) show how information can be revealed
by converting (or not converting) bonds. Oded (2011) takes into account that when a
company makes a tender offer to its shareholders to buy back its shares as a means to
distribute excess cash, there is an asymmetry of information between the company buying
back the shares and the shareholders. Due to this asymmetry, the company must pay a
premium since the shareholders do not profit from the information they acquire.
Gibson and Singh (2000) and Gibson et al. (2006), henceforth GS and GPS, provide
a two-type model on how put options sold by a company can convey information to the
purchasers of the option. Namely, a company with a good outlook should wish to increase
its short-term price by signalling its value via a (public) put sale. The purchaser is willing
to buy the options since they are sold at a fair price (and neither side profits directly from
the transaction). The main differences between GS/GPS and our model is that, first, we
model the situation as screening as opposed to signalling. Second, we allow for sales to be
actuarially unfair since the buyer could lose money on the sale, but gain through market
purchases of the underlying stock. Third, we model the company’s put buyback option
that allows more information to be conveyed.
This put buyback option, which we believe may be present either explicitly or implicitly
in contracts in the future, allows the company to buy back the put options at market
prices (and may have implicitly been exercised in the past such as by Microsoft). However,
this option might make one question whether the put buyback option could disrupt the
original separating equilibrium. We also explore this possibility and show that not only
can the original separating equilibrium remain intact, but there can be an additional stage
of separating where only those companies with a low final value will make use of this
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option. This use shows that the tool of the put option with a buyback gives a purchaser
the ability to screen the market in both directions and enables them to discover both the
signal received by the company about its future valuation but also potentially learn the
value before the market.
2.1 Example with Put Sales Only
In this subsection, we provide a basic example of how the separating equilibrium occurs
with just put option sales before proceeding to an example of the put buybacks. Such an
equilibrium is necessary for screening to occur on behalf of an investment bank or their
clients.
For simplicity we assume that the future value can be one of two types: high or low.
A company receives a signal about the likelihood that its value is high. This signal also
can be either high or low. A company with a high signal is willing to sell put options at a
specified premium and strike price, while a company with a low signal is not willing to sell
put options under these conditions. These conditions allow the buyer of the put option to
deduce the company’s signal.
A company has one project that has an uncertain value v. This is the entire worth
of the company. The company receives a signal about the distribution of the value of the
project. The signal can be h (high) or ℓ (low) with equal probability. If the signal is h,
then there is a 4
5
chance that the company is worth $200, 000 (a high value) and a 1
5
chance
it is worth $100, 000 (a low value). If the signal is ℓ then there is a 1
5
chance the company
is worth $200, 000 and a 4
5
chance it is worth $100, 000. There are 1, 000 shares of stock.
The company’s objective is to maximize its expected (future) share price (keeping the
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outstanding shares constant). Note that this setup differs from GS and GPS, who assume
a company’s objective is to maximize a weighted average of its expected future share price
and current share price.
As is, the stock price is $150. Now assume that the company sells 500 put options for
a combined premium of $10, 000 with a strike price of $150. As a function of value, the
stock price must satisfy:
s =
v + 10, 000− 500 ·max{150− s, 0}
1000
. (1)
Note that we assume that the company pays in cash rather than shares for an exercised
option. This assumption simplifies the analysis and makes no difference in the results.5,6 If
v ≥ 140, 000, then the equilibrium price is s = v
1000
+10. On the other hand, if v ≤ 140, 000,
then s = v
1000
+ 10 − 75 + s
2
. This last equation can be simplified to s = v
500
− 130. Thus,
with a high value the stock is worth s = 210 and with a low value the stock is worth s = 70.
A company with a signal of h has an expected stock price before the sale of E[s] =
4
5
200 + 1
5
100 = 180 and after the sale of E[s] = 4
5
210 + 1
5
70 = 182. Therefore, selling
the put options is worthwhile to the company. A company with a signal of ℓ has an
expected stock price before the sale of E[s] = 1
5
200 + 4
5
100 = 120 and after the sale of
5In practice, the put options gave the company the choice of settling the options in cash or company
stock but the options were never settled in stock. For example, Microsoft 10-Q, filing date 11/14/96, states
“The warrants expire at various dates between the second quarter of fiscal 1997 and the second quarter of
fiscal 1998, are exercisable only at maturity, and are settleable in cash at Microsoft’s option.”
6We see this equivalence by the following example. If a company has two shares outstanding, a sole
investment worth $200, and an outstanding put option with a strike price of $120. The company can settle
for stock and pay $120. In this case, the remaining share is worth $80. Otherwise, the company can pay
the cash difference of $40 and then have two shares worth $80 each (which would be the market price
beforehand).
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E[s] = 1
5
210 + 4
5
70 = 98. Therefore, selling the put options are not worthwhile to the
company. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of this analysis.
<<< Insert Figure 1 >>>
Hence, a separating equilibrium exists in which only companies that receive a high
signal sell put options. Notice that in this particular example, the company selling the
put options, on average, has a gain from the sale. In a full screening model, the buyer
chooses the put option and premium to create the minimum benefit to the company that is
necessary to ensure separating. For instance, here, the strike price can be set to 160. This
would lower the share price in the low state to 60, whereby, the expected share price after
the sale is E[s] = 4
5
210 + 1
5
60 = 180. (This strike price makes the put options actuarially
fair since there is a 1/5 chance of them being in the money making 160 − 60 = 100 per
put.) However, this strike price could be limited by both the bargaining power of the buyer
and the information structure. (See the end of Section 2.3 for a longer explanation.)
After the put option is sold (or not sold), the party buying the put option could then
use this information to make an additional bet on the stock price such as buying the stock
and betting that the share price will go up (or if the put option is not sold, it could sell
the stock short betting the price will go down).
2.2 Example with Put Buybacks
Now let us add to the above example, put buybacks. This happens when the company
has additional information after the put sale. Let us say that the company has a µ chance
(1 ≥ µ > 0) of knowing the value of the project before the market (but after the put
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transaction).7 The company can buy the puts back for a price of b per put. Since the puts
are only in the money when the value of the project is v = 100, 000, the company only
buys them back in that case. A timeline is presented in Figure 2 and a game tree of the
options (excluding those of the bank) is presented in Figure 3.
<<< Insert Figure 2 >>>
<<< Insert Figure 3 >>>
If the company buys back the puts, then the stock price is then s = 110− b/2.8 (Note
that they only do so if b ≤ 80 since the strike price is 150 and the stock price with the
buyback will be 70.)
A company with a signal of h has an expected stock price before the sale of E[s] = 4
5
200+
1
5
100 = 180 and after the sale of E[s] = 4
5
210 + 1
5
[
µ
(
110− b
2
)
+ (1− µ)70
]
. Therefore, to
maximize the expected share price, selling the put options is worthwhile if µ
(
40− b
2
)
≥
−10.
A company with a signal of ℓ has an expected stock price before the sale of E[s] = 1
5
200+
4
5
100 = 120 and after the sale of E[s] = 1
5
210+ 4
5
[
µ
(
110− b
2
)
+ (1− µ)70
]
. Therefore, the
options are not worth selling if 27.5 ≥ µ
(
40− b
2
)
.
Thus, we can have separation at two different times in three different ways. First, we
can have separation as in the previous example where only the companies with the h signal
sell puts but do not buy them back after learning their value such as when b > 80. Second,
7We assume that µ is independent of both the signal and the actual value, although similar results
would hold with dependency.
8The stock price is equal to the value (100, 000) plus the premiums from selling puts (10, 000) minus
the cost of buying back the put contracts (500 · b), all divided by the number of shares outstanding (1000).
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only the companies with the h signal sell puts and then they buy them back only if the
outcome is bad. For example, if b = 30 and µ = 0.9. Third, for a small enough b and
a large enough µ, we can have no separation occurring when the put is sold, but there is
separation when the put is bought back such as when b = 22 and µ = 0.95.
2.3 Two-Type Model with Buybacks.
We now proceed to generalize the basic example into a two-type screening model with put
buybacks and two possible outcomes. Again, there is a company that has an uncertain
value v with Ns shares of stock outstanding. The company gets a signal, h (high) or ℓ
(low), about the distribution of its value. If the signal is h, then there is a θ chance (where
1 > θ > 1/2) the company is worth vh (a high value), and a (1 − θ) chance it is worth vℓ
(a low value) where vh > vℓ. If the signal is ℓ, then there is a (1− θ) chance the company
is worth vh, and a θ chance it is worth vℓ. Again, the company has a µ chance (1 ≥ µ > 0)
of knowing the value of the project before the market (but after any put sale) and can buy
the puts back for a price of b > 0 per put. Again, the timeline of this setup is the same as
that in Figure 2 and the game tree is the same as that in Figure 3.
A company is offered a take-it-or-leave-it contract of (Np, p, x, b) ∈ {1, . . . , Ns} ×R
+ ×
R
+ ×R+ where Np is the number of put options, p is the premium for each share, x is the
strike price, and b is the buyback price.
Lemma 1 If p ≥ x then the company will always accept the put contract.
Proof. Since the stock price will be strictly positive, the maximal payment for each put
contract is strictly less than x. Since a company receives p for each put contract, it will
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always make a profit. Thus, it is worthwhile to accept the offer.
Lemma 2 If b < p, then the company will always accept the put contract.
Proof. It will be profitable for the company to sell the contract to the bank and then buy
back the contract for a lower price. A company may not buy back the put option, but even
if the company knew ahead of time the state would be vℓ, it would be worthwhile to sell
the put option.
Lemmas 1 and 2 show which parameter regions will not be of interest. The following
lemma finds for which values the options are in the money, which must occur for low values
if signalling exists via the purchase of the options.
Lemma 3 If the company sells the options and does not buy them back, then the options
are in the money at the expiration date if and only if the project value v is strictly less than
v∗ = xNs − pNp.
Proof. If the company indeed sells the put options but does not exercise the buyback,
then as a function of the value, the stock price (if positive) must satisfy:
s =
v + pNp −Npmax{x− s, 0}
Ns
. (2)
By substitution x for s into equation (2), we can find the value v∗ that causes s = x. This
computes to v∗ = xNs − pNp, strictly below which the option is in the money.
Corollary 1 If the cutoff is strictly higher than the high value (xNs− pNp > vh), then the
options are always in the money.
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Proof. The cutoff is always lower than the value. By Lemma 3, the options are always in
the money.
Corollary 2 If the cutoff is strictly lower than the low value (vℓ > xNs− pNp), then there
is pooling.
Proof. In this case, the cutoff is always lower than the value, which can be high or low.
By Lemma 3, the options are always out of the money. In this case, the company is always
willing to sell them and is never willing to buy them back.
If there is pooling, then there is no information gained from the initial sale. Furthermore,
the company does not buy back the put options since they are always out of the money
and there is no information gained from any buyback offer. Overall, a buyer would lose
money from buying a put that reveals no information and always expires worthless. Thus,
we would not expect to see such offers.
There are cases where there will be buybacks. The following lemma finds for which
values a company will try to buyback the put options. This buyback must occur only for
low values if signalling occurs via buybacks.
Lemma 4 A buyback occurs only if xNs − pNp − b(Ns −Np) ≥ v.
Proof. Without buybacks, if v ≥ v∗, then snb,≥ =
v+pNp
Ns
is the equilibrium stock price. If
v ≤ v∗, then the equilibrium price snb,≤ must satisfy:
snb,≤ =
v
Ns
+
Np
Ns
(p− x+ snb,≤). (3)
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Solving for snb,≤ yields
snb,≤ =
v +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
. (4)
If the company exercises the buyback, then the stock price sb is instead
sb =
v − (b− p)Np
Ns
=
v + pNp − bNp
Ns
. (5)
Clearly, the buyback only occur if the put is in the money, i.e., v ≤ v∗, since snb,≥ > sb.
Furthermore, when the put is in the money, the buyback can only occur if the value of the
stock is higher with the buyback than with paying out the put. This can happen if and
only if sb ≥ snb,≤ or
v + pNp − bNp
Ns
≥
v +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
. (6)
This equation simplifies to
xNs − pNp − b(Ns −Np) ≥ v. (7)
Corollary 3 A buyback occurs only if the put is in the money and either b is sufficiently
small or Np is sufficiently high (close to Ns).
A buyer may also be concerned about counter party risk. Hence, in the following
Lemma, we look at when this would be of concern.
Lemma 5 The company will not be able to pay all the put obligations if and only if xNp
> vℓ + pNp.
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Proof. The worst case for the company (and maximum payoff on the put option for the
company) occurs when the project has a low value vℓ. It would not be able to pay the put
option, if and only if, the share price drops to 0. The total liability is xNp and the total
assets are vℓ + pNp, which is the value of the project plus the put premiums.
Condition C1ℓ: vℓ ≤ xNs − pNp (the cutoff is above the low value).
Condition C1h: xNs − pNp ≤ vh (the cutoff is below the high value).
Condition C1ℓ avoids the trivial cases where the options are always out of the money
and the investment bank would never want to buy them. Together with Condition C1h
allows us to analyze the case when the option is only in the money when the value is low.
Thus, without buybacks in a high state the stock is worth s = vh+pNp
Ns
and in a low state
the stock is worth s = max{vℓ+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
, 0}.
Condition C2: xNp ≤ vℓ + pNp (no bankruptcy).
Condition C2 is consistent with the empirical finding that no issuing company went
bankrupt. However, having such a risk only strengthens the argument that the trade is
unprofitable for the buyer without gaining information in return.
Condition C3ℓ: b <
xNs−pNp−vℓ
(Ns−Np)
(put buyback is priced sufficiently low).
Condition C3h: b >
xNs−pNp−vh
(Ns−Np)
(high value is sufficiently high).
Note that C3ℓ and C3h can both hold together, however if C3ℓ does not hold, then C3h
holds. Likewise, if C3h does not hold, then C3ℓ holds. In sum, at least one of the two
conditions must hold.
Condition C4: b > p.
This condition follows from Lemma 2.
We now present the main result of the model section which describes three types of
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equilibria that convey information to the buyer of the put option.
Proposition 1 (i) If Conditions C1ℓ, C1h, C2, C3ℓ, C3h and C4 hold, a double separating
equilibrium (via purchase and buyback) exists if and only if
θ
1− θ
≥ µ ·
b− p
p
+ (1− µ)
(
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
p (Ns −Np)
)
≥
1− θ
θ
. (8)
(ii) If Conditions C1ℓ, C1h, C2, C3ℓ, C3h, and C4 hold, a separating equilibrium only via
buybacks exists if and only if
1− θ
θ
≥ µ ·
b− p
p
+ (1− µ)
(
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
p (Ns −Np)
)
. (9)
(iii) If Conditions C1ℓ, C1h, C2, C4 hold, but Conditions C3ℓ does not hold, a separating
equilibrium via put options (but not buybacks) exists if and only if
θ
1− θ
≥
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
p (Ns −Np)
≥
1− θ
θ
. (10)
(iv) If Conditions C1ℓ, C2, C3ℓ, C3h, C4 hold and C1h does not hold, a double separating
equilibrium (via purchase and buyback) exists if and only if
1− θ
θ
≤
[
(Ns −Np)
(vh −Ns(x− p))
]
·
[
µ · (b− p) + (1− µ) ·
(
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
(Ns −Np)
)]
≤
θ
1− θ
. (11)
(v) If Conditions C1ℓ, C2, C3ℓ,C3h, C4 hold and C1h does not hold, a separating equilibrium
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only via buybacks exists if and only if
[
(Ns −Np)
(vh −Ns(x− p))
]
·
[
µ · (b− p) + (1− µ) ·
(
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
(Ns −Np)
)]
≤
1− θ
θ
. (12)
(vi) If Conditions C1ℓ, C2, C4 hold, but Conditions C1h and C3ℓ do not hold, a separating
equilibrium via put options (but not buybacks) exists if and only if
θ
1− θ
≥
vh −Ns(x− p)
Ns(x− p)− vℓ
≥
1− θ
θ
. (13)
Proof. (i) We start by proving part (i). By Lemma 4, Condition C3ℓ and C3h assure
that a buyback will only occur for a low value. In Figure 3, Condition C3ℓ assures that the
company would choose left (buy) at nodes d and g, while Condition C3h assures that the
company would choose right (not buy) at nodes e and h. Condition C4 assures that the
decision at nodes c and f would consistent with the decision nodes a and b. This is because
there is no gain of information for the company and if the company wanted to sell a put
for a premium p, they would not want to buy it back for a price b strictly larger than p.
Given now the decisions at nodes c to h, we now compute the share price of the company
under several options in order to check the incentive constraints such that the company
chooses not to sell a put option at node a and chooses to sell a put option at node b.
h signal, no put option: A company with a signal of h that chooses not to sell a put
option has an expected stock price of
sh = θ
vh
Ns
+ (1− θ)
vℓ
Ns
. (14)
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h signal, put option sale and separating buyback: If C1h holds, with chance θ, the
value is vh, and the stock price is worth
vh+pNp
Ns
. With chance (1 − θ), the value is vℓ, and
the company has a µ chance of buying back the puts leading to a stock price of vℓ+Np(p−b)
Ns
and a (1 − µ) chance of being forced to pay out the put option (by Lemma 3, since C1ℓ
holds), which results in a stock price of vℓ+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
, which is positive due to Condition C2.
Overall, the expected stock price is:
sh,p,b = θ
vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1− θ)
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
. (15)
ℓ signal, no put option: Likewise, a company with a signal of ℓ that does not sell the
put option will have an expected stock price of
sℓ = (1− θ)
vh
Ns
+ θ
vℓ
Ns
. (16)
ℓ signal, put option sale and separating buyback: A company with a low signal and
a separating buyback will have an expected stock price of
sℓ,p,b = (1− θ)
vh + pNp
Ns
+ θ
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
. (17)
Hence, we can have a double separating equilibrium, where only the company with a high
signal sells the puts and a company with a low value buys back the puts, if and only if
sh ≤ sh,p,b (weakly preferred to sell a put option at node b) and sℓ ≥ sℓ,p,b (weakly preferred
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to not sell a put option at node a). By substitution from equations (14)-(17), we have
θ
vh
Ns
+ (1− θ)
vℓ
Ns
≤ θ
vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1− θ)
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
,
(18)
(1− θ)
vh
Ns
+ θ
vℓ
Ns
≥ (1− θ)
vh + pNp
Ns
+ θ
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
.
(19)
These conditions can be simplified to
0 ≤
θ
1− θ
+
Ns
pNp
·
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
, (20)
0 ≥
1− θ
θ
+
Ns
pNp
·
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
. (21)
Combining yields
1− θ
θ
≤
Ns
pNp
·
[
vℓ
Ns
− µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
− (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
≤
θ
1− θ
. (22)
This reduces to inequality (8).
(ii)We now prove part (ii), which states constraints when a separating equilibrium only via
buybacks exists. Like for part (i), Conditions C3ℓ, C3h, and C4 assures that the decisions
at nodes c to h will be consistent with a separating equilibrium via a buyback. For the
decisions at nodes a and b to be consistent, we must have sℓ ≤ sℓ,p,b (weakly preferred to
sell a put option at node b) and sh ≤ sh,p,b (weakly preferred to sell a put option at node
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a). By substitution from equations (14)-(17), we have
θ
vh
Ns
+ (1− θ)
vℓ
Ns
≤ θ
vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1− θ)
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
,
(23)
(1− θ)
vh
Ns
+ θ
vℓ
Ns
≤ (1− θ)
vh + pNp
Ns
+ θ
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
.
(24)
Since θ > 1
2
, the second inequality (24) implies the first inequality (23). Hence, we have
this type of equilibrium if and only if (9) holds.
(iii) We now prove part (iii). C1ℓ, C1h, C2, C4 hold, but Conditions C3ℓ does not hold,
By Lemma 4, the fact that Condition C3ℓ does not hold assures that a buyback will
not occur for a low value (and hence also not for a high value). This and Condition C4
assures that the decisions at nodes c to h will be consistent with a separating equilibrium
without a buyback.
h signal, put option sale and no buybacks: If C1h holds, with chance θ, the value is
vh, and the stock price is worth
vh+pNp
Ns
. With chance (1− θ), the value is vℓ the company
pays out the put option, which results in a stock price of vℓ+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
, which is positive due
to Condition C2. Overall, the expected stock price is:
sh,p,nb = θ
vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1− θ)
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
. (25)
ℓ signal, put option sale and no buybacks: and after the sale of the put option an
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expected stock price of
sℓ,p,nb = (1− θ)
vh + pNp
Ns
+ θ
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
. (26)
Hence, we can have a separating equilibrium without buybacks if and only if sh ≤ sh,p,nb
(weakly preferred to sell a put option at node b) and sℓ ≥ sℓ,p,nb (weakly preferred not to
sell a put option at node a). By substitution from equations (14), (16), (25), (26) we have
θ
vh
Ns
+ (1− θ)
vℓ
Ns
≤ θ
vh + pNp
Ns
+ (1− θ)
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
(27)
(1− θ)
vh
Ns
+ θ
vℓ
Ns
≥ (1− θ)
vh + pNp
Ns
+ θ
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
(28)
Simplifying
[
vℓ
Ns
−
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
≤
θ
(1− θ)
pNp
Ns[
vℓ
Ns
−
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
≥
(1− θ)
θ
pNp
Ns
These further simplify to inequality (10).
(iv) Here we prove Part (iv). The company can have a high value vh that is also in the
money (since C1h does not hold) but we still have a double separating equilibrium. Again,
we must show that sℓ ≤ sℓ,p,b and sh ≤ sh,p,b and these are equivalent to (the difference is
the share price of a company selling puts in the high state is now worth vh+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
instead
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of vh+Npp
Ns
):
θ
vh
Ns
≤ θ
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
+ (1− θ)
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
,
(29)
(1− θ)
vh
Ns
≥ (1− θ)
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
+ θ
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
.
(30)
Combining yields inequality (11). Notice when vh goes to v
∗, (11) reduces to the condition
when vh is not in the money.
(v) Here we show part v. The difference between this part and part (ii) is that Condition
C1h does not hold. Similar to the last part, we must use
vh+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
instead of vh+Npp
Ns
, but
now in replace in inequality (24), which becomes:
(1−θ)
vh
Ns
+θ
vℓ
Ns
≤ (1−θ)
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
+θ
[
µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
+ (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
]
.
Rearranging yields:
θ
[
−µ ·
vℓ +Np(p− b)
Ns
− (1− µ) ·
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
+
vℓ
Ns
]
≤ (1−θ)
(
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vh
Ns
)
which simplifies to inequality (12).
(vi) We now prove part (vi). Again, we must use vh+Np(p−x)
Ns−Np
instead of vh+Npp
Ns
, but now in
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inequalities (27), (28). Doing so yields:
0 ≤ θ
[
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vh
Ns
]
+ (1− θ)
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
, (31)
0 ≥ (1− θ)
[
vh +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vh
Ns
]
+ θ
[
vℓ +Np(p− x)
Ns −Np
−
vℓ
Ns
]
. (32)
These further simplify to:
0 ≤ θ [−Ns(x− p) + vh] + (1− θ) [−Ns(x− p) + vℓ] , (33)
0 ≥ (1− θ) [−Ns(x− p) + vh] + θ [−Ns(x− p) + vℓ] . (34)
Combining yields (13).
While Condition C2 (no bankruptcy) is used in the Proposition, one can get similar
qualitative results when C2 does not hold when the value is vℓ.
In summation of the Proposition, we find there are 3 types of equilibria in which the
company that sells put options conveys information. The first, a double separating equi-
librium conveys information in two stages: only companies with high signals are willing
to sell the put options; and once the put options are sold, only companies that discover
their value is low before the market does, are willing to buy the put options back. There
is another possible single separating equilibrium in which the price of the buyback is too
high and only companies with high signals are willing to sell the put options, but they are
not willing to buy them back even if their value is low. The third is a single separating
equilibrium in which the put option sales do not convey any information (a company is
willing to sell the put independent of their signal), but the buyback conveys information
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because only a company that discovers its value is low before the market is willing to buy
back the put options.
In the following three examples we show how the Proposition works in each of the types
of equilibria.
Example 1 Double Separating occurs when θ = 4
5
, vh = 200, 000, vℓ = 100, 000, Ns =
1000, Np = 500,x = 150, p = 20, µ = 0.9 and b = 30.
We then have constraint (8): θ
1−θ
≥ µ · b−p
p
+ (1 − µ)
(
Ns(x−p)−vℓ
p(Ns−Np)
)
≥ 1−θ
θ
simplify to
4 ≥ µ · b−20
20
+ (1− µ)
(
1000(150−20)−100,000
20·500
)
≥ 1
4
or 4 ≥ µ · b
20
+ 3 − 4µ ≥ 1
4
. Substituting for
µ and b, yields 4 ≥ 0.75 ≥ 1
4
.
Furthermore, C1ℓ is satisfied since vℓ ≤ xNs − pNp simplifies to 100, 000 ≤ 150 · 1000−
20 · 500); C1h is satisfied since xNs − pNp ≤ vh simplifies to 150, 000− 10, 000 ≤ 200, 000;
C2 is satisfied, since xNp ≤ vℓ + pNp simplifies to 75, 000 ≤ 100, 000 + 10, 000; C3ℓ is
satisfied since b < xNs−pNp−vℓ
(Ns−Np)
simplifies to 30 < 150,000−10,000−100,000
(1000−500)
; C3h is satisfied, since
b > xNs−pNp−vh
(Ns−Np)
simplifies to b < 150,000−10,000−200,000
(1000−500)
.
Example 2 A separating equilibrium only via buybacks occurs when θ = 4
5
, vh = 200, 000,
vℓ = 100, 000, Ns = 1000, Np = 500, x = 150, p = 20, µ = 0.95 and b = 22.
We then have constraint (9), 1−θ
θ
≥ µ · b−p
p
+ (1 − µ)
(
Ns(x−p)−vℓ
p(Ns−Np)
)
, simplify to 1
4
≥
µ · b
20
+ 3− 4µ = 0.245. Again the other constraints are satisfied.
Example 3 A separating equilibrium via put options (but not buybacks) occurs when θ = 4
5
,
vh = 200, 000, vℓ = 100, 000, Ns = 1000, Np = 500, x = 150, p = 20, and b = 100.
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We then have constraint (10), θ
1−θ
≥ Ns(x−p)−vℓ
p(Ns−Np)
≥ 1−θ
θ
, simplify to 4 ≥ 1000(150−20)−100,000
20(500)
=
3 ≥ 1
4
.
Note that Conditions C1ℓ, C1h, and C2 hold as before, but C3ℓ, b <
xNs−pNp−vℓ
(Ns−Np)
, does
not hold since 100 > 150,000−10,000−100,000
(1000−500)
Notice that in these three examples, the equilibrium that we present is unique. There
is no indifference on decision nodes (a)-(h). This uniqueness also holds whenever the
inequalities (8)-(13) are strict.
For a separating equilibrium to exist, we need Ns > Np (i.e., the number of put options
sold should strictly be smaller than the number of shares outstanding). This is consistent
with the way that the boards of directors authorize put-option sales for ongoing open
market repurchase programs. Also higher premiums p might require a higher strike price
x in order to maintain the possibility of the separating equilibrium. This is clear because
a company with a low signal is more inclined to sell put options with a higher premium
p and a higher strike price x might be necessary to deter them from doing so. Further, a
smaller value in the low state vℓ might require a higher premium p and/or a lower strike
price x in order to maintain the possibility of the separating equilibrium. A smaller value
in the low state (when the option is in the money) makes the expected value of the option
higher; hence, the option should command a higher premium (or be adjusted by a lower
strike price).
If there is a possibility of a buyback (µ > 0 and Condition C1 holds), then there is a
trade-off between µ and b. For a b sufficiently close to p and µ large, we get separation
only in the second stage. A double separating equilibrium requires b to be in a mid-range
for each µ: not so small as to entice a company with a low signal to sell puts, but not so
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high as to deter a company with a high signal from selling puts or buying back the puts
when the company’s value is low.
This model shows that a financially strong company receives a reward for selling put
options and certifying their quality, while financially weak companies choose not to par-
ticipate because of large expected financial penalties of issuing the put option. This is
an unusual way that information is revealed. In most examples of separating equilibria,
a strong type must expend effort or spend cash in order to convey his or her strength.
Here, the company conveys its strong financial future by selling the put option and receives
cash flow for certifying its quality rather than enduring a cost from its action. However,
the financially weak company finds the issuance expensive to mimic despite this possible
reward.
This screening device allows the counterparties to separate the companies with positive
signals from those with negative signals. From these companies with positive initial signals,
the device allows the counterparties to separate those with an additional positive signal
from those with an additional negative signal. This device represents a financial innovation
by the investment banks.
While we don’t explicitly model the bank (buyer of the put options), we can draw
implications from the effect of the purchaser’s behavior after purchasing a put option.
These testable implications are: (1) the volume of shares transacted increases around the
put option sale (it starts once it is clear the sale will go through), (2) there is an abnormal
return on the share price after the put sale, and (3) the companies are likely to make a profit
from the transaction, that is, premiums minus expected payouts are positive. Implication
(1) is the result of the investment bank or its clients acting on the information gained from
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the put sale. Implication (2) indicates that the information gained is valuable because the
companies that are more likely to sell a put are those more likely to have a gain in share
price. The reasoning behind implication (3) is similar to implication (2); those companies
that sell put options need to be enticed to do so, therefore, they are not likely to lose money
overall. Although we predict that the counterparty might be able to take advantage of the
information gained by those companies not willing to sell put options, it is not empirically
testable because we have no data on when those failed negotiations took place.
While in practice, options do not explicitly allow the sellers to buy them back, an
optimally designed contract might include this ”callability” as a feature. For example,
companies could try to issue and then possibly retire puts whenever they acquire new
substantial information. Microsoft (MSFT) issued puts more or less in every quarter for
several years and did indeed buy back their put options in 2000 that saved them significant
sums after new information indicated a downswing in price.9
As mentioned earlier, a separating equilibrium can still exist when a company makes zero
profits in expectation. Then, given that the buyer is the one proposing the transaction, why
9When the largest dollar amount of put options per quarter was issued by Microsoft (February 2000
was most likely the last month of issue), the stock price suffered the black swan event of both the dot-com
crash (starting March 2000) and the Supreme Court ruling against Microsoft (April 3, 2000). During this
tumultuous time, the investment bank allowed Microsoft to repurchase the put options at a loss of $1.4
billion (in the 2001 fiscal year). While substantial, this amount is in stark contrast to what might have
happened if the bank didn’t allow Microsoft to repurchase the put options. The per-share stock price fell
from $111.87 in March 23, 2000, to $41.50 on December 20, 2000. Thus, out of the $12.2 billion potential
repurchase obligation, Microsoft could have paid as much as $5.7 billion in the worst case or $2.4 billion
using average stock prices.
Microsoft’s 2000 Annual Report for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2000, stated that ”On June 30,
2000, warrants to put 157 million shares were outstanding with strike prices ranging from $70 to $78 per
share. The put warrants expire between September 2000 and December 2002.” Using the average stock
price for this period of $58.85 and the mean strike price of $74, if the options were allowed to expire,
Microsoft would have lost $2.4 billion. In the worst case scenario, using a strike price of $78 and a share
price of $41.50, Microsoft would have lost $5.7 billion.
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does the company make a profit as the empirical evidence suggests? While not explicitly
modelled, we offer several non-exclusive possible explanations.
Like in the ultimatum game (Gu¨th, 1982), the proposer might not be able to fully
exploit his or her bargaining power due to a fear of rejection by the other side and might
be forced to divide the pie more evenly. Further, the buyer might not have full bargaining
power and therefore might negotiate the transaction rather than dictate it with a take-it-
or-leave-it offer. The pie then is not a zero-sum result because it includes profit made from
trading on the information gained, so a non-actuarially fair price is a feasible solution.
Another reason for why the seller might profit is that there might be more than one
type that the buyer wishes to screen for. This gives some sellers information rents. For
instance, there are different levels of high types and the buyer might want to know which
is which. To do so, the buyer has to reward the higher high types so they do not pretend
to be lower high types.
Finally, there may be a cost of issuing the put option borne by the management. The
profit on the transaction itself covers this cost.
Furthermore, we claim here that the selection of a transaction also entails having a
reasonably large number of option contracts (rather than an option contract on a single
share). The buyer might want the size of the bet contained in the put options to be fairly
large. A larger bet gives the company incentives to both take measures to prevent mistakes
(such as have the managers invest more time with the sale) and to invest in making a more
accurate forecast through better information acquisition.
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data Sources
We search for all companies that sold put options from January 1991 through December
2000 by using 10-K and 10-Q statements available on the Lexis-Nexis R© database for the
whole period and on the SEC’s EDGAR database from January 1994 through December
2000.10 We find 383 companies that have at least one of the key “put” phrases in at least
one of their financial reports. Of these, we drop companies that sold put options only
on interest rate, foreign exchange, and/or debt securities. We are left with 53 companies
that used their own stock as the underlying asset in the issuance of put options. For these
remaining companies, we collect and analyze all of the 10-Q and 10-K reports from 1991
to 2012. These 53 companies came from 34 industries as indicated by their four-digit SIC
codes. For these 53 companies, we looked for news articles and announcements in both
Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for 60 days around the put option sales. From all sources, we do
not find any announcements that released positive news around the put sales.
10The period encompasses not only the years in which companies were highly active selling puts on their
own stocks (see Gyoshev (2001) and Jenter et al. (2011)), but was also a relatively calm period between two
recessions. We terminated our search period in 2000 when this calm period ended and where companies
suspended their programs with the development of the prolonged bear market. We note, however, that
put sales have been recently reintroduced by investment banks to a different set of companies. We are
not using these sales since many of the programs are still ongoing and also many of the companies did
not release the necessary information to determine the sales date. Although the Lexis-Nexis R© database
started collecting the 10-K and 10-Q statements in 1988, the first company with a put options sale was IBM
in 1992. On the other hand, the SEC’s EDGAR database started in January 1994. We use the following
search phrases: ”put derivative”, ”put option”, ”equity put”, ”put feature”, ”stock put”, ”put provision”,
”put the shares”, ”sale of put”, ”sold put”, ”put sold”, ”put warrants”, and ”rights to put.”
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3.2 Transaction Dates
Only ten of the 53 companies report the exact date on which they sold put options for
the first time. In order to find the date in the remaining cases, we look through all 10-K
and 10-Q statements for references to the option expiration. Based on these references, we
are able to estimate the date for an additional eight companies. Similarly, 11 companies
report the month when they sold put options, and we infer the month for an additional 16
companies. Four companies report only the quarter, while the remaining four companies
report only the year when they first issued put options.
The ten put contracts for which we know the exact sale date have expiration dates set
3, 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24 months after the sales. Using this knowledge, we are able to estimate
the expiration date for eight other companies by combining information from different 10-Q
or 10-K reports. For instance, the Clorox 10-Q report for the quarter ending on December
31, 1993, states that Clorox sold put options in the “first fiscal quarter of 1994” (between
7/1/93 and 9/30/93), while the Clorox 10-Q report for the quarter ending on March 31,
1994, states that “all put warrants expired unexercised on February 22, 1994.” Therefore,
we conclude that the date on which the contract was signed is six months prior to the
expiration on August 22, 1993, since that is the only possible date that is within the
specified dates and fits one of the possible customary contract lengths.
In addition, by using the 10-K and 10-Q reports for 20 companies, we are able to identify
at least the quarter that the put option sale was made in. In 16 of those, we are able to
accurately estimate the month by combining information from different 10-Q and 10-K
reports in a manner similar to that described above.
The most complete information on the put option sales tends to be provided by the
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first 10-Q or 10-K that reports the transaction. After the first report, the information gets
less complete with each consecutive disclosure that prevents us analyzing subsequent sales.
3.3 Summary Statistics
In Table 1, we report the summary statistics for the put options issued by our sample
companies. The majority of the companies, 32 of 53, issued European-style put options;
only 11 issued American-style put options. Because only American-style options can be
traded on the CBOE, it seems that few companies intended to place their put options
publicly. This is directly confirmed by looking at the second column of Panel A in Table 1
where we report the type of buyers disclosed in the financial statements. Only one company
publicly disclosed the sale of put options on an exchange. The rest sold their options to
private counterparties. In most cases the identity of the buyer was not disclosed, but if
disclosed, the buyer was usually either an investment bank or another institutional investor.
More than 40% of the companies disclosed that their issues were long-term put options with
maturities greater or equal to one year. These were not standard maturity lengths on the
CBOE at the time.
<< Insert Table 1 here >>
We report the descriptive statistics for the time until disclosure in the fourth column
of Panel A in Table 1. The median time from the date of the option sale to the date it
was disclosed in the companies’ financial statements is 99 days, while the average is 186
days. Only one company announced its intent to sell put options in advance of the deal.
The maximum time between a deal transaction and announcement was a staggering 1,561
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days, or more than four years.
Further, in Table 1, we examine both the initial and consecutive put option sales and
report the extent to which the options were exercised or expired. We find that most of the
options expired out of the money. In only two cases did companies state that all of the
options were exercised (both these cases occurred when the company involved only issued
one tranche of put options). In 32 cases, all of the options (for all the tranches) expired
out of the money. In six cases, the put options for the last tranche only were settled early
(including Microsoft that settled the option after 24th quarters of selling puts); and in eight
cases, the last tranche of options were exercised with the initial tranches expiring worthless.
Five of the companies did not report the outcome, which indicates that the put options
expired worthless because otherwise they would have reported the sales as material events.
We did not have any cases where the options were settled early or exercised and there was
another tranche of put options sold afterwards.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Abnormal Stock Performance
Table 2 reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the 18 companies
with an identifiable date for their first put option sale. Even though Table 1 shows that
companies report the sale after more than six months, the average CAR for a two-day
window after the date of the sale is slightly more than 2% (This is statistically significant
at the 5% level despite the small sample size.). Moreover, the CAR for the 60-day window
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is 9.08% and is also statistically significant at the 5% level.11 Figure 4 provides a graph of
the CAR.
<< Insert Figure 4 here >>
Further, we find that the stock price performs negatively in the 60-day period before
the put option sale. Our understanding from speaking with practitioners is that the sale
of put options is a long drawn-out process that takes between one and three months. As
we indicated in the model section, the company’s managers engage in selling put options
only if they feel the stock is undervalued. From the moment that negotiations of a put
option sale are initiated until just before the completion date, the random-walk nature of
the stock prices yields three basic scenarios: the stock could go up, down, or stay at the
current price level. Once the sale is near completion, the managers still consider the sale
only in the latter two scenarios. Hence, because the stock performance of those companies
that have begun negotiations might go up during the negotiations, conditional on the sale,
the stock’s performance should be negative. This is a form of survivorship bias.12
<< Insert Table 2 here >>
11The one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return is computed using the Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)
methodology and is 11.67% with a p-value of 0.03045.
12Note this negative performance opens the possibility that there is mean-reversion in the stock prices
around the put option sale. To distinguish between our explanation and mean reversion, we take each of
the 18 companies selling put options with identified dates and match it with all 26,500 CRSP companies. If
company A sold a put option on March 1, 1997, and experienced an abnormal return of x% for the 60 days
prior, we choose the closest 100 companies by their return y% (close defined by the smallest (x− y)2). We
observe that the sample that we get is not mean reverting, because the average return of those companies
that sell put options is 9% while the return in the matched sample is close to zero. These returns are
significantly different at the 1% level (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.000).
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This negative stock performance is also consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998)
who find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock-price performance.
We recognize that event studies have potential weaknesses such as the cross-sectional
correlation of the abnormal returns associated with clustering event dates (see Kliger and
Gurevich, 2014, chapter 6, page 65–83, Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010). Our event dates are
not clustered– they have a mean day difference of 128.9 and a median day difference of 83.
By generating 100,000 random samples of event days over a similar period, we find a mean
day difference of 128.167 and a median day difference of 92.4. Furthermore, we find that
32,291 of these samples have a larger difference between the mean and median than the
difference from our event dates.13
4.2 Abnormal Stock Trading Volumes
Abnormal trading volumes perhaps positively influence the stock price and generate the
positive abnormal returns in the short event windows. Figure 5 is generated by taking
each company’s daily volume and dividing it by the daily volume on day -60. This method
normalizes the average volume across this time period to one. We then take the average
of these adjusted volumes over all 18 companies. This method is a crude way to examine
trading volume while treating each company equally independent of its size. The graph
shows that the volume increases by 40% before the transaction date and stays relatively
high until about ten days after the transaction date before drifting down. Consequently, we
surmise that most of the increased volume occurs before the stock price starts increasing.
13The list of event dates are: 1992-09-16, 1993-03-30, 1993-08-22, 1994-04-04, 1994-06-26, 1994-08-03,
1994-08-07, 1996-01-22, 1996-03-03, 1996-07-16, 1997-07-13, 1997-09-01, 1997-09-18, 1997-10-23, 1997-11-
05, 1998-04-26, 1998-09-15, and 1998-09-17.
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This 40% increased volume could be a sign that the counterparties are accumulating shares
as the transaction becomes more likely and doing so to a large extent without showing their
hand.
<< Insert Figure 5 here >>
The cumulative abnormal relative volume (CARV) in Table 3 shows a similar story.14
Although the overall volume significantly decreases from days -60 to -1, the volume is
abnormally high from -10 to -1. It remains high between days 0 and 10. The overall
abnormal volume does not remain statistically significant if we extend it from 10 to 60
days.15 Note that the companies themselves did not purchase shares during this timespan
(there is no substantial decrease in the number of shares outstanding and treasury shares).16
<< Insert Table 3 here >>
4.3 Structural Breaks in Stock Prices
We test if a structural break exists in the average abnormal returns around the date of
the put option sales (where a structural break is a sharp unexpected directional change in
14See Ajinkya and Jain (1989), Campbell and Wasley (1996) and Cready and Ramanan (1991) for how
abnormal trading volume is computed.
15There was no such volume changes in the option markets. This is not surprising given that the overall
volume of the put options on the stock was roughly 1% to 10% that of its volume. Hence, if someone
wanted to make a profit from a rising stock price without significantly influencing the market, it would be
easier with stocks rather than with options.
16We have computed the change in the shares outstanding using CRSP’s monthly data and find the
maximum change was less than 1% of average daily volume. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that this
method yields a higher figure for repurchases than the three Compustat measures that they examine.
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the trend). Such a structural break is an indication that there is an endogenous change
produced by the sale of the put options. Therefore, in this subsection, we follow Andrews
(1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) to test for an endogenous structural break in
the stock prices. We compute the bootstrapped p-value following Hansen (2000).
We start by testing for a structural break in the average abnormal returns of the 18
companies on the exact date of the put option sales. As reported in Panel A of Table 4,
the Chow (1960) breakpoint test rejects the null hypothesis that no structural break exists
at the exact date of the transaction (day 0) at the 1% level (p = 0.0022).
<< Insert Table 4 here >>
To better understand the nature of this structural break, we try to find the most likely
structural break point from days -25 to 25 by making use of stock prices from days -60 to
60 (under the assumption of at most one structural break). In Panel B of Table 4 we report
that the structural break is seven days after the sale of the put options. The p-values for
the SupF statistics (Andrews, 1993) as well as for the ExpF and AveF statistics (Andrews
and Ploberger, 1994) are statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, we find supporting
evidence that the purchaser of the put options is not only trading on information but doing
so skillfully and not making the trading immediately transparent to the market.
For robustness, we test for a structural break in Panels C and D of Table 4 for the ten
companies with reported sales dates only and also find that the break remains seven days
afterwards (but it is not statistically significant). When we test for a structural break in
the eight remaining companies with inferred transaction dates, we find the structural break
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is at the day of the sale and is significant at the 5% level. This result gives support for our
technique of inferring transaction dates.
Overall, the timing and the statistical significance of the structural break confirms a
sharp unexpected directional change in the trend of the stock prices. Jenter et al. (2011)
suggest instead that the market upswing is exogenous and that the company managers are
using insider information to correctly time this upswing (See Chan et al., 2007, for why
pseudo-market timing is unlikely to be an explanation). The location of our structural
break indicates that their timing seems to indeed be impeccable especially in the face of
potentially long-lasting negotiations. Moreover, Jenter et al. (2011) state that “discussions
with market participants suggest that such offers were extended to all large companies with
share repurchase programs and high stock market liquidity.” This statement implies that
the investment bank initiates the timing of the negotiations rather than the seller.
Another plausible explanation has the causality reversed. Rather than put sales being
placed right before the upswing, the upswing comes right after the put sale. Given that
the sales have not been publicly disclosed, the likely source of an upswing in this causality
direction is the active buying of the company’s stock by the purchaser of the put options.
This finding also supports our explanation that the reason why the put option transaction
is initiated is to acquire and trade on information.
4.4 Structural Breaks in Stock Trading Volumes
An analysis of the trading volume around the event day could demonstrate in retrospect
the degree of abnormal activity that results from the private information of the parties
in the put option sale. As with stock prices, we test for structural breaks in the daily
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trading volumes of the selling companies’ stock around the put option sales. Using similar
techniques to those used for stock prices in subsection 4.3, we test for a structural break
in the stock volumes at the event day. We make adjustments for our sample companies
by accounting for market volume and report three analyses for patterns of relative trading
volumes.
Panel A of Table 5 reports a structural break, which is statistically significant at the
1% level with p = 0.0001 (for all methods we use). Panel B of the same Table shows the
results of the tests for structural breaks in the stock volumes for any day between -25 and
25 around the event day. We find that the most likely structural break is at day -19, which
is statistically significant at the 1% level with p < 0.0001 (for all methods we use). In
Panel B of Table 5, we report a second structural break in the time frame of -19 to 60 at
day 12, which is statistically significant at the 5% level with p = 0.0176 (for all methods
we use). As explained above the put-sale negotiation process is a one to three month long
process. These statistical results are consistent with an informed party starting to trade on
the information obtained during the negotiation process 19 days before the transaction is
completed. This trading is skillful because it does not change the trend of the stock price
until seven days after the put option sale where the stock price’s structural break occurs.
The results are also consistent with the informed party reducing purchases at day 12 after
the sale where there is another structural break in the volume.
As reported in Table 2, over the 10-day period following the put option sales the average
abnormal return is negative at -1.39%, but over the 60-day period following the put option
sales the average abnormal return is positive at 9%, yet the high volume decreases at date
12. The 60-day period’s abnormal return is significantly different from zero at the 5%
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level (p=0.04, t-test). Our claim is that the increased price is not a mere artifact of the
increased trading, but a reflection of the information learned by one party. Hence, the
sustained price is consistent with our claim that the investment banks or their clients are
screening the companies in order to gain non-public information and are profitably trading
on that information.
<< Insert Table 5 here >>
Overall these results support the existence of both an abnormal return and an abnormal
trading volume around the put option sales.
4.5 Evidence from Trading by Insiders
In this section, we find additional evidence in support of the theory that the management of
the company is indeed informed about the undervaluation of the stock. Company insiders
(upper management as well as shareholders with a larger than 5% stake) must report to
the SEC on form 13-D any transactions of the company’s stock as well as type: purchased
(P) or sold (S) on the open market, options that are exercised (M), or company stock or
options that are awarded (A) to them. This report includes the day that the transaction
occurred. (See Bonaime´ and Ryngaert, 2013, Ben-Rephael et al., 2014, and Bonaime´,
2015, for analyzing 13-D transactions with relation to share repurchases.) We find only
one insider that was not upper management at the time of the transactions but was in the
same year prior to the transactions.17
17All of his transactions occurred more than 60 days prior to the put sale and are not included in the
analysis.
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We break the dates of such transactions into three ranges: before, during, and after.
These ranges are determined by the structural breaks in the volumes found in section 4.4,
that is, before is defined as -60 to -20 trading days before the sale, during is defined as days
-19 to 12, and after is defined as days 13 to 60. We then look at how many transactions
fall into each range and perform a binomial test on whether the proportion of transactions
is in accordance with the number of days in the ranges. The results of these tests are in
Table 6.
<<<Insert Table 6>>>
We find that A and S transactions in during are significantly less than the combination
of before and after, at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. In addition, P transactions in
during are significantly more than the combination of before and after, at the 1% level.
We also find that M and S transactions in after are significantly less than in before, at the
1% and 10% levels, respectively. In addition, we find that A, M, and S transactions in
during are significantly less than before, at the 1%, 1% and 5% levels, respectively, while P
transactions in during were significantly more than in before at the 10% level. Finally, we
find that A transactions in during are significantly less than in after and that P transactions
in during were significantly more than in after, both at the 1% level.
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that insiders are informed: An informed
insider sells less and purchases more on the open market in during. Since the stock price
still increases in after, we expect that the insider will sell less than in before. Again since
the stock price increases in after, we expect that an informed insider will delay the exercise
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of call options.18
We also note that the company determines the A transactions. There are three possible
scenarios. First, the company prefers to save money and thus does not want to award
stock or options when they expect the stock price to increase. Second, the managers of the
company want to award themselves stock or options at the lowest possible price and do so.
Third, the legal department of the company (or fear of legal action) stops the managers
from awarding themselves stock or options close to a material sale of puts. In the first case,
we expect awards to be smaller in during and possibly smaller in after. In the second case,
we expect awards to be higher in during. In the third case, we would expect awards to be
smaller only in during and possibly higher in after. Thus, we find support for the first and
third possibilities.
We note that Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007) find evidence that during the period
of our study the awarding of call options were retroactively set to coincide with lower stock
prices. This is the opposite result from what we find: precisely when the price is lowest is
when there is the least awarding of options. However, the explanation for this discrepancy
is clear. The put options sold and the awarding of call options are a matter of record.
Therefore if they coincide, then this could raise suspicions that could alert the SEC to
their illicit behavior. Heron and Lie (2009) estimate that 29% of all firms were involved in
such illegal manipulation. Thus, in view of this literature, our third possibility seems most
likely.
18If they know with certainty the stock price will go up and the amount, then they are indifferent as
to when they exercise their executive call options. However, since this increase is only expected and not
certain, it is better to wait. Take for instance an option whose strike price is at the stock price in during.
If there is a 90% chance the stock will continue to go up and a 10% chance it will go down, the optimal
strategy is to wait to see the result and then exercise the option.
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4.6 Evidence from Institutional Filings of Trading
<<< Insert Table 7 >>>>
In this section, we examine the filings of 13F forms around the put option sales. The
SEC requires both institutional investors and insiders to report stock transactions. In Table
7, Panels A and B, we look at which institutions increase and which decrease their holdings,
respectively. By comparing this amount to the abnormal volume, we can see if a particular
institutional investor causes a large percentage change. On average, the largest increase in
holdings for an institution is 12% of the abnormal volume, while the share for all institu-
tional investors on average is 41% of the abnormal volume. This share makes it unlikely
that an institutional investor caused the abnormal volume. Furthermore, when we compare
this to institutional selling, then it seems even more unlikely. The largest decrease for an
institution is equal to -12% with the total decrease due to institutional investors equal to
-55%. Because these numbers are similar, the concept that the institutions themselves were
profiting from the information advantage gained from buying the put options is unlikely.
As a further check, in panel C, we examine which institutions were doing the buying and
selling and find little relationship.
4.7 Potential Realized Profits from Trading on Information.
As shown in subsections 4.3 and 4.4, there is a structural break in stock prices and two
structural breaks in volume (an increase followed by a decrease). We postulate that the
purchaser of the put options might be making use of its private information gained from
the purchase to accumulate shares of the underlying stock. Naturally, if indeed such an
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action is taking place, then what are the potential profits? Of our 18 companies (out of
the 53) for which we have accurate information on sales dates, 15 have increases in volume
(around the transaction date) and three have decreases in volume. Of these 15 companies,
11 have price increases while four have price decreases.
For all 11 companies with volume and price increases, the total potential profit is $717
million. For the three companies with volume increases and price decreases, the total
potential loss is $70 million. Thus, a hypothetical party could have made $647 million on
these initial put purchases (net of put costs this should be close to 98% of the sum).
We compute the abnormal trading activity by multiplying the abnormal volume by the
number of days it occurs. We estimate the price gain as the difference between the average
stock prices around the put sale and the average stock price from 50 to 60 days after the
sale. The potential profit is then the abnormal trading activity multiplied by the price
gain.
As an example, one of the companies that has both an increase in volume and an
increase in price is Premisys Communications Inc. Premisys disclosed a put transaction in
their 10-K for the fiscal year ending on June 26, 1998. Premisys sold 10,000 contracts of
put options for $1.75 million at a strike price of $10.625 per share for 100 shares of their
common stock ”PRMS” for a total of options on 1 million shares. If one entity accounted
for the abnormal volume (approximately 15 million shares), then that entity made around
$80 million. If this entity was the party that bought the options from Premisys, then it
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paid only $1.75 million for the information leading to this $80 million gain.19
4.8 Hedging versus Profitable Trading on Non-Public Informa-
tion
The owners of put options are only exposed to the upside risk to profit if the share price
decreases. Hence, the purchasers might not even want to hedge this risk. In the Premisys
example, the potential profits from purchasing stock around the sale were more than 40
times the premium. But hedging of the puts by the purchasers is inconsistent with causing
the abnormal volume. The magnitudes of the abnormal volume that we report in Table 3
and Figure 5 are also inconsistent with the hedging explanation. In an attempt to explain
this inconstancy, we reread all of the 10-Q and 10-K reports for the 18 companies with
reported or assumed put sale dates for all available dates from 1991 to now in order to
examine the possibility of hedging further. We report the results in Table 8.
<< Insert Table 8 here >>
Of the 18 companies, only six report all of the information that is required to accurately
estimate the profits reported in Table 8. The total put premium for those six companies is
$4,709,904 written on 2,255,000 shares.
We use the Black–Scholes–Merton formula (Black and Scholes, 1973, and Merton 1976)
to compute the hedge ratio and the corresponding number of shares that are necessary
19The average volume before the structural break was 595,934 per day, the average volume around the
put option sale between the two structural breaks in the volume series was 1,098,285, which gives as an
abnormal volume of 502,351 for the 31 days between the two structural breaks. The average price between
the structural breaks was $9.27 and the average price between days 50 and 60 days after the sale was
$14.34. So the difference is $5.07, which gives an abnormal profit of around $80 million = $5.07 * 502,351
* 31.
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to hedge these put options. The average hedge ratio is 0.6537. Assuming that the pur-
chaser wants to be delta neutral and wants to hedge, then the amount by which they are
over-hedging is on average 2,247%. This amount of over-hedging can only be interpreted
as speculation or profitable trading on non-public information. Furthermore, the total
potential profit made by the put purchaser of $62.5 million cannot be attributed to the
coincidence of hedging $4.7 million purchased put options.
The important point to remember is that these put options are zero-sum games where
the company has an informational advantage. However it can still be worthwhile for the
purchaser to play this game if the purchase gains from this acquired information. As our
model indicates the information may be acquired by the purchaser in two ways: (1) when
the company sells the put options, it indicates to the purchaser that the company has bullish
forecasts. (2) the purchaser can later suggest to the company to buy back the put options.
If the company refuses, then the purchaser gets the information that the management
is still bullish. If the company agrees, then the purchaser gets the information that the
company is bearish. We see some evidence of these two forms of acquiring information in
that with rare exceptions the contracts expired worthless. This supports (1). In addition,
of the remaining cases where the contracts did not expire worthless, 6 out of 16 were settled
early and 10 out of 16 were held to maturity. This supports (2) in that if the purchaser
offered to settle during a downward trend of the stock, we would see some settlements when
the company was indeed bearish. We would also see holding to maturity (and exercised)
when the company was bullish, but prices were either not as high as expected or higher
than the offer made to the company yet still low enough to leave the put option in the
money. Finally, both early settlements and holding to maturity were in the last tranche of
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put sales, indicating that after both these had happened, the overall company outlook was
bearish.
5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks.
Jenter et al. (2011) offer an explanation for why put option sales occur right before increases
in stock prices, namely, that the managers are excellent at timing their put option sales.
We offer another plausible explanation: purchasers use the put option sales as a screening
mechanism to acquire information. By making use of this information to purchase stocks,
the purchasers cause the stock price to increase. In other words, the causation is in a
different direction from Jenter et al. (2011). We find support for the idea that put option
sales trigger increases in stock prices and increases in trading volumes, instead of stock
prices causing the initiation of the put sales.20 This provision of information story for put
sales is consistent with Bonaime´ (2015), who finds evidence that share repurchases act as
signals.
We develop a theoretical model that shows how purchasers of put options from compa-
nies can gain information. If then the buyers of the put options start purchasing stock, this
could be a trigger for an overall stock price increase. We find empirical evidence (adjusted
for market risk and volume) in support of this trigger explanation.
A party that uses option purchases appears to bypass the illegal aspect of gaining
insider information. Theoretically, a trader wants to gain insider information because this
20An endogenous price increase should occur shortly after the put option sale while any exogenous price
increase should occur later (unless the price has already incorporated it). Jenter et al.’s (2011) explanation
is that the time of the price change is exogenously predicted by the manager as opposed to our explanation
that the timing of the price change is endogenously set by the manager through the sale of the puts.
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information allows the trader to predict stock-price movements and realize abnormal profits.
In put option purchases, investment banks do not directly gain any insider information on
performance, but they do indirectly gain the opinion of the company’s management on
the future performance of the stock price. Only the managers with positive outlooks are
willing to sell put options to the investment banks. Furthermore, these investment banks
have this information exclusively in their possession on average for more than six months,
as per the current disclosure regulations.
While we present one explanation for why an investment bank or their clients would buy
a put option directly from a company, there are alternative explanations. First, managers
are overconfident about their company’s future prospects.21 Given this overconfidence,
managers tend to underprice the options, and the investment bank exploits this underpric-
ing. If the company’s stock return abnormally declines following the sale of the put options,
then this decline might indicate management overconfidence. However, for a sample of 18
companies that sell put options, we find a positive 60-day average cumulative abnormal
return of 10.4% after the initial sale that is inconsistent with management overconfidence.
Another possibility is that the counterparties are hedging against declines in the com-
pany’s stock price. The support for this explanation is that most of these put option
transactions occurred between 1992 and 2000, which was a period in the midst of a pro-
longed bull market. The argument against hedging is the increased volumes and abnormal
returns around the put option sales that point to increased share acquisition with the knowl-
edge that the company is optimistic about the future price. Still, it could be that those
21See Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) for both an overview of overconfidence and a reason why man-
agerial overconfidence as a characteristic could be beneficial to the company.
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purchasing put options are encouraged to buy shares rather than that they are hedging
shares already owned; however, these volumes are higher than the number of put options.
While we cannot completely rule out hedging shares already owned or hedging future share
purchases, our findings still suggest that it is unlikely to be the whole story.
Answering the question in the title of this paper is important. If acts by large market
participants seem irrational, then there are two possible explanations. One is that we do
not know the entire picture and the second is that the parties are actually making big
mistakes. We learned from the 2007-2009 financial crisis that if the latter is true then
allowing such parties to make such mistakes can have damaging consequences. However, in
our paper, we see the former possibility and discover that the investment banks could be
rational: they might be trading on insider information obtained in a seemingly legal way
or receiving commissions by acting as an intermediary whereby allowing another party to
make such a gain. This explanation leads to the policy recommendation to shut down that
loophole.
Hence, from the policy perspective our results shed light on that absence of immediate
disclosure currently allowed in the US markets. The lack of regulations allows both compa-
nies and investment banks and their constituents to profit from trading in company-issued
derivatives at the expense of broad market participants. However, even if we mandate full
and immediate disclosure of all put option sales pursued by companies, then front-running
(as indicated by the increased volume starting before the put sale) would still exist. The
key instead would be to make private sales of put options illegal to be replaced by exchange-
traded put options, which Angel et al. (1997) argues can fulfill any legitimate firm’s need
for private put options. Requiring exchange-traded sales will prevent screening by buy-
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ers, but will still allow signaling by the companies, which would be seen by the market as
preventing investors from privately profiting from information gained from such signals.
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